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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the present status of Russia's chemical weapons destruction 
program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC). It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world's 
largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It 
also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the 
conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this chemical 
demilitarization program. The thesis then investigates the development of the pilot nerve 
agent destruction facility at Shchuchye, Russia, which has been the primary focus of U.S. 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program support to the destruction of Russia's chemical 
weapons. In view of the decisions by the U.S. Congress to eliminate funding for this 
destruction facility in FY2000 and FY2001, the thesis examines the apparent causes of 
these decisions, including concerns about Russian commitment to full implementation of 
the CWC. The thesis concludes with a review of arguments for continued U.S. and allied 
support for the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The thesis examines the present status of Russia's chemical weapons destruction 
program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC). It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world's 
largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It 
also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the 
conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this chemical 
demilitarization program. 
The thesis then investigates the development of the pilot nerve agent destruction 
facility at Shchuchye, Russia, which has been the primary focus of U.S. Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program support to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. This 
investigation serves as a case study regarding the immense obstacles facing the Russian 
chemical demilitarization program as a whole. Finally, this thesis examines the merits of 
continued U.S. and allied support for the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. 
The existence of Russia's 40,000-ton chemical weapons stockpile poses serious 
threats to environmental and international security. Russia's past practices of chemical 
weapons disposal have already created public health hazards among the communities 
living near the "chemical graveyards.'; Nonetheless, the deteriorating conditions of the 
storage tanks at Gorny and Kambarka, which hold blister agents produced in the 1940s, 
could cause an ecological catastrophe that would affect countries well beyond Russia's 
borders. The locations ofRussia's chemical munitions sites are now publicly known, yet 
the security of these sites remains grossly inadequate. The minimal protection and 
ix 
rudimentary tracking of CW munitions increase the temptation for insider theft and 
smuggling and provide an attractive target for terrorists and the illegal arms market. 
Due to its significant economic troubles, Russia's progress in destroying its 
chemical weapons stockpile has been inadequate. Russia is not able to pay for its 
chemical demilitarization program and must rely heavily on foreign assistance to 
eliminate its stockpile. The United States, the largest contributor to Russia's CW 
destruction program, has focused its assistance on the disposal of Russia's nerve agents. 
The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program has funded part of the construction of a 
pilot nerve-agent destruction facility at the Shchuchye site. In view of the decisions by 
the U.S. Congress to eliminate funding for this destruction facility in FY2000 and 
FY2001, the thesis examines the apparent causes of these decisions, including concerns 
about Russian commitment to full implementation of the CWC. The thesis concludes 
with a review of arguments for continued U.S. and allied support for the destruction of 
Russia's chemical weapons. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The thesis examines the present status of Russia's chemical weapons destruction 
program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC). It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world's 
largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It 
also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the 
conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this chemical 
demilitarization program. 
The thesis then investigates the development of the pilot nerve agent destruction 
facility at Shchuchye, Russia, which has been the primary focus of U.S. Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program support to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. This 
investigation serves as a case study regarding the immense obstacles facing the Russian 
chemical demilitarization program as a whole. Finally, this thesis examines the merits of 
continued U.S. and allied support for the destruction ofRussia's chemical weapons. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a treaty that entered into force on 
29 April1997. The CWC bans the use, development, production, stockpiling, and 
transfer of chemical weapons (CW).l Currently, 135 countries have ratified the treaty but 
only four countries - Russia and the United States included - have admitted to the 
1 Chemical Weapons Convention, Available [Online]: <http://www.opcw.nllptshome.htm. [18 March 
2000). 
1 
possession of chemical weapons and have pledged to destroy them. 2 According to the 
schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons provided by the Convention, 1% of 
Category I chemicals must be destroyed within three years (that is, by April2000), and 
the complete destruction of all Category I chemicals must be accomplished within ten 
years (that is, by April2007). These chemicals are warfare agents; they include nerve 
agents, mustard agents, lewisites, and toxins, and have limited or no peaceful use. 3 The · 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the administrative body 
responsible for the implementation of the ewe, can authorize a single five-year 
extension to the deadline.4 
The commitment made by the United States and Russia to adhere to the CWC has 
proven to be highly demanding and costly. The cost of America's program to destroy its 
30,000-ton chemical weapons arsenal, originally estimated at $1.7 billion in 1985, has 
grown to the current estimate of$15.7 billion.s Nonetheless, the United States remains 
on schedule, having destroyed over 15% of its Category I chemicals.6 Due to its 
significant economic troubles, Russia's progress in destroying its 40,000-ton chemical 
2 The OPCW and the State Parties, Available [Online]: <http://www.opcw.nllptshome.htm. [18 March 
2000]. The other two countries are India and South Korea. 
3 Category I includes chemical warfare agents and their precursors. Category II includes dual-use 
chemicals of limited use. Category ill includes dual-use chemicals of extensive use. 
4 Chemical Weapons Convention, Available [Online]: <http://www.opcw.nllptshome.htm. [18 March 
2000]. 
5 Harold P. Smith, Jr., "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden," Arms 
Control Today, November/December 1998 uoumal on-line]; Available from 
<http:/ /www.armscontrol.org/ ACT /novdec98/cwnd98.htm; [19 March 2000]. 
6 Scott Gourley, "USA Ahead of Schedule in Destroying Chemical Arms," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 
May 2000, Available from <http://jdw.janes.com; [24 May 2000]. 
2 
weapons stockpile has been less than minimal. It failed to meet the 29 April 2000 
deadline for destroying 1% of its Category I chemicals, according to Alexander 
Gorbovsky, an official at Russia's federal Munitions Agency.7 Russia has appealed to 
the OPCW to extend the overall deadline from 2007 to 2012. According to the acting 
director of verification for OPCW, this appeal will be approved.& 
Despite the extension, it is highly unlikely that Russia will be able to adhere to its 
commitment to the CWC by the deadline of2012. Russian officials and independent 
experts estimate that the destruction program will take from fifteen to thirty years to 
eliminate the entire stockpile.9 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on primary and secondary sources pertaining to Russia's 
chemical weapons destruction program, the environmental hazards and proliferation risks 
associated with the present stockpile, and the challenges (both intem;:tl and external) to 
Russia's implementation of the CWC commitments. A case study of the Shchuchye 
project is used to examine the numerous factors impeding the successful destruction of 
Russia's chemical weapons arsenal. One of these factors may be the continuation or 
termination of assistance from the United States. 
7 Simon Saradzhyan, "Russian Chemical Anns Disposal Plan Falters," Defense News, 15 May 2000, p. 18. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Kathleen Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical Weapons: A Lab-to-Lab Partnering 
Program," The Nonproliferation Review Vol.6 No.2, Winter 1999 [journal on-line]; Available from 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs!npr/vogel62.htm; [16 March 2000]. 
3 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter IT examines the present status of the declared weapons sites, the 
destruction plan, and the challenges to destruction. Chapter ill analyzes the 
environmental and public health risks posed by the chemical weapons storage and the 
proliferation potential of the chemical weapons. Chapter IV examines the progress and 
challenges of the Shchuchye Project as a case study for U.S, and Russian cooperation 
efforts. Chapter V discusses the implications of Russia's potential withdrawal from the 
ewe and of Russia's possible non-compliance. It also offers conclusions concerning 
further U.S. assistance to the Russian chemical demilitarization program. 
4 
II. RUSSIA'S CHEMICAL STOCKPll..E 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapon agents on Russian territory. 
This represents the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons. The chemical agents 
are contained at seven declared sites (Pochep, Maradikovsky, Leonidovka, Shchuchye, 
Kizner, Kambarka, and Gorny) located primarily along the Volga river basin in western 
Russia (see Figure 1). Each site contains approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the 
total stockpile, with the exception of Gorny which holds almost three percent. I o 
-40,000 metric tons 
Pochep - 18.8% 
VX, sarin, soman 
Gomy-2.9% 
mustard, lewisite (+ mixture) 
Maradykovsky- 17.4°/e 





• c u ye-13.6% 
· ,-.,.. VX, sarin, soman, 
\ ~-~-~~p_oo_s~~e------~~ 
VX, sarin, soman, 
lewisite 
Figure 1. Composition and Distribution of Russia's Chemical Weapon Agents. 
After Ref [<http:/ /www.armscontrol.org/ ACT/novdec98/cwjpg.jpg]. 
10 Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical Weapons." The question of possible undeclared 
sites is discussed in Chapter ill. 
5 
The greater part of the declared stockpile (80%, or 32,300 metric tons) consists of 
organophosphorus nerve agents (VX, sarin, soman) while the remainder (20%, or 7,700 
metric tons) consists of blister agents (mustard gas, lewisite, or a mustard/lewisite 
mixture) and phosgene. II The nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions 
(aviation, rocket artillery, and artillery) distributed among five storage facilities while the 
blister agents are primarily stored in bulk in storage tanks at Kambarka, with lesser 
amounts at Kizner, Gorny, and Maradikovsky.I2 Unlike the many U.S. munitions 
targeted for destruction under the U.S. weapons disposal effort, the Russian munitions are 
fortunately not loaded with explosives or propellants (known collectively as energetics) 
which would complicate the destruction plan and increase the difficulty of implementing 
it.I3 
B. THE DESTRUCTION PLAN 
The legal and administrative framework for the destruction of chemical weapons 
on Russian soil was established before CWC ratification. First, Governmental Order No. 
305 of 21 March 1996 outlines the timetable and administrative framework for the 
Russian CW destruction program. Second, the bill titled "On the Destruction of 
II Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical Weapons." 
12 Ibid. 
13 :Milton E. Blackwood, Jr., "Arsenic and Old Weapons: Chemical Weapons Disposal in Russia." The 
Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring/Summer 1999): 90. 
6 
Chemical Weapons," signed into law on 2 May 1997, provides the basis for the 
destruction of CW on Russian soil in accordance with the CWC.I4 
Governmental Order No. 305 prioritizes the destruction of chemical weapons 
agents by phases. The first phase of the plan calls for the destruction of blister agents 
stored in bulk at Gorny and Kambarka. Blister agents take priority since bulk chemicals 
are easier to process than the nerve agents weaponized in munitions. Also; due to the 
deteriorating condition of the storage tanks at Gorny and Kambarka, these agents pose the 
greatest danger to public health and the environment. Construction of a pilot blister-
agent destruction facility at Gorny is currently in progress although it has already 
exceeded its initially scheduled 1998 completion date. The second phase of the plan is 
the destruction of nerve agents stored in munitions at the remaining five depots. The 
original plan projected construction of five nerve-agent destruction facilities to be 
completed by 2001. However, construction of the pilot nerve-agent destruction facility at 
Shchuchye has been delayed due to a number of obstacles, and its completion date is 
presently indeterminable. IS A more detailed discussion of the Shchuchye project is 
presented in Chapter IV. 
C. CHALLENGES TO DESTRUCTION 
The destruction plan designed by the Russian government in 1996-97 has failed to 
achieve any substantial successes in its implementation. Russia's ability to destroy its 
chemical weapons arsenal has been severely constrained, if not immobilized, by a 
14 Monterey-Moscow Study Group on Russian Chemical Disarmament, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of 
the Cold War: Overcoming Obstacles to Russian Chemical Disannament." Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies Report (1998). Available [Online]:<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/mmsg.htm. [17 March 2000]. 
15 Ibid. 
7 
number of internal and external problems, including shortfalls in government funding and 
foreign assistance, plus public opposition to the proposed methods of destruction. 
1. Government Funding 
For Russia, the years since 1991 have been filled with massive economic and 
budgetary crises. Vital government programs, including health, education, and defense, 
are competing for the limited funds available given the government's financial 
constraints. Allocating the necessary funds for chemical weapons disposal has been a 
daunting task for Russian officials. In 1998, the official cost estimate for destroying the 
Russian CW stockpile was approximately $5.7 billion over a 10-15 year period.l6 
This estimate does not include additional costs associated with Russia's CW 
destruction. First, the cost to implement CWC requirements, including the annual dues to 
the OPCW, the cost of on-site facility inspections, and the expenses accrued from hosting 
the OPCW teams during inspections, will add up to approximately $330 million for the 
10 year deadline. Second, the cost of socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the 
communities near the proposed destruction sites is estimated at more than $1 billion. 
Finally, funds for improved security and environmental controls at the sites and for the 
conversion of CW production facilities will need to be provided.l7 
To date, the Russian government has spent only a small fraction of the amount the 
Russian Parliament has nominally allocated toward chemical weapons disposal. From 
1995 to 1997, the government spent $10 million for CW destruction, which was 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. Since Russia will probably receive a five year extension on the deadline, the estimated costs for 
ewe requirements and maintenance of the facilities will likely increase. Overall destruction costs may 
increase exponentially, as they did for the United States, when normal operations begin. 
8 
approximately 14% of the amount nominally allocated by the Russian Parliament. 
Shortly prior to the November 1997 ratification of the CWC, Prime Minister Viktor 
Chemomyrdin informed the Russian Parliament that the government would increase 
funds to $86 million for CW destruction in 1998 but this proposal was never included in 
the 1998 Federal Budget Bili.l8 
Russia's level of government funding is grossly insufficient to cover the costs of 
Russian CW disposal and merely adequate to cover routine maintenance and upkeep of 
the facilities. According to Colonel-General Stanislov Petrov, commander of the 
Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops, 
The finance provision is poor. To give you an example, in 1996 we got 1 
percent of the allocations requested and 5.5 percent of the budget 
allocations, the funds provided by the budget. Five or seven percent 
represents the sort of funding that enables us to hold our ground in the 
situation and it is without any sort of breakdown. There cannot be any 
substantive work being done.l9 
Russia has suggested plans to increase funding for the CW destruction plan 
through an arsenic recovery project. Approximately 2,300 tons of arsenic, which is used 
primarily in the microelectronics industry, could be extracted from the 8,000 tons of 
lewisite stockpile.20 At 1998 prices, one ton of semiconductor-grade arsenic would be 
worth between one and two million dollars.21 However, this project would probably not 
18 Ibid. According to the Moscow-Monterey Study Group report, Prime Minister Chemomyrdin' s proposal was stated in his "On Financing Activities in the Area of Chemical Disarmament" letter to Chairman ofthe State Duma G.N. Seleznyov, dated 27 October 1997. 
19 Petrov quoted in Vogel, "Ensuring the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons." 
20 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 92. 
21 Ibid. 
9 
produce such monumental profits considering the high cost of converting the lewisite to 
arsenic and the finite size of the market for arsenic. 22 
2. Foreign Assistance 
Aside from its own funding, Russia's plan to finance its chemical weapons 
disposal program relies heavily upon significant amounts of foreign assistance. General 
Anatoli Kuntsevich, former chairman of the Presidential Committee for Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Matters, stated in June 1997 that Russia needed foreign assistance to 
finance up to 80% of the total cost of chemical weapons disposal to meet the 
requirements of the CWC.23 To date, aid has come from a number of Western European 
countries, the European Union (EU), and the United States. 
Western European nations have provided approximately $31 million in the form 
ofbilateral aid projects through 1999 to aid Russia's destruction program. Sweden has 
contributed approximately $420,000 to Russian chemical demilitarization projects, 
including risk analysis for the Kambarka CW site and support for a public outreach center 
to "link Russian military authorities and local citizens." The Netherlands and Finland 
have also supported projects at Kambarka totaling $5.5 million in aid. Germany has 
promised $11.8 million in aid for the blister-agent destruction facility in Gorny while 
Norway has committed $190,000 for effective environmental and health monitoring at 
the same site. 24 
22 Monterey-Moscow Study Group, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War." 
23 Kuntsevich quoted in Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 93. 
24 Paul F. Walker, "Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Technical and Political Challenges 
in the US and Russia." The CBW CoJTVentions Bulletin 4 (June 1999). Available 
[Online]:<http://www.gci.ch/pd£'CWCBull.PDF. [March 16, 2000]. 
10 
Upon Russia's CWC ratification on 5 November 1997, the EU collectively agreed 
to provide $15 million in technical and financial assistance through 1999. This assistance 
will be directed toward environmental and health monitoring at Gorny as well as "micro-
projects in civil society and ecological monitoring. "25 The EU provides assistance to 
Russia's CW destruction program through the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) program.26 
The United States is providing assistance to the Russian CW disposal effort 
through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which "supports 
joint programs between the United States and the former Soviet republics to secure and 
dismantle weapons of mass destruction, prevent weapons proliferation, and demilitarize 
the former Soviet defense industry."27 In 1992-1999, the United States spent more than 
$1.5 billion in assistance to Russia through CTR. The vast majority of funds went to the 
reduction of the nuclear threat in former Soviet states with approximately $200 million 
going to the destruction of chemical weapons.28 However, the United States recently 
halted funding for a previously supported Nunn-Lugar project to plan, construct, and 
initially operate a chemical weapons destruction facility at the Shchuchye site, which 
contains 13% of the Russian CW stockpile.29 U.S. financial and technical assistance to 
25 Ibid. 
26 Monterey-Moscow Study Group, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War." 
27 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 89. 
28 Ibid. 
29 David Filipov, "Russian Arms Center Opens," Boston Globe, 6 April2000, 2. 
11 
Russia's CW destruction program is discussed in greater depth in the case study in 
Chapter IV. 
The contributions by the European Union, various European nations, and the 
United States to assist Russia in the dismantlement of its chemical arsenal fall far short of 
the billions necessary to accomplish the task on schedule with the CWC deadline. 
3. Public Opposition 
Local communities near the chemical weapons sites are arguably the greatest 
obstacle Russia faces in implementing its CW destruction program. The citizens are 
apprehensive about the construction of the chemical weapons destruction plants in their 
areas due to public health and environmental concerns and a growing distrust of the 
central government. This apprehension is not unwarranted given the Soviet Union's 
legacy of secrecy in burying vast amounts of chemical agents near populated 
communities and the well-publicized nuclear accident at Chemobyl. 30 
The power of Russian communities to stop proposed chemical weapons 
destruction operations has a precedent. In 1986, the Soviet government built a 
demonstration destruction facility near the city of Chapayevsk in the Samara region. 
Local authorities had approved plans for the construction of the plant but the local 
population was not informed. During its final stages of construction, the local population 
became aware of the facility and its purpose. This resulted in tremendous grass-roots 
opposition, with protest rallies, picketing, and petitioning to end the project. Soon 
afterward, the local council voted against completion and operation of the destruction 
30 Russia's historic environmental practices are discussed in detail in Chapter Ill. 
12 
plant. The federal government abandoned its plans for a chemical disposal site at 
Chapayevsk. 
The Chapayevsk case, combined with public concern about the transportation of 
toxic chemicals, led to President Yeltsin's decision in 1992 that chemical weapons will 
be destroyed at the seven sites where they are currently stockpiled and that all future 
plans must include provisions to improve the social conditions and infrastructure of 
surrounding areas.3l Today, the Chapayevsk facility is only used for technical training 
on CW destruction techniques. 32 
Many local mayors and their citizens are refusing to permit construction of 
chemical weapons facilities until satisfactory guarantees are made concerning 
socioeconomic benefits to the area. The Russian government's CW destruction plan does 
provide for such infrastructure projects, to include building of roads, electric power 
supplies, and water and sewer systems, to facilitate the new plant's operations. Other 
proposed projects include medical clinics and recreational facilities, which will be solely 
for the benefit of the local population. These "compensatory" projects will be necessary 
for the destruction plan to continue but will require the Russian government to pay 
additional costs estimated at more than $1 billion. 33 
This is a pressing issue among the regional governors and representatives who 
have stated that no chemical weapons will be destroyed until Moscow delivers such 
socioeconomic investments. According to Paul F. Walker's assessment, "Chemical 
31 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 91. 
32 Monterey-Moscow Study Group, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War." 
33 Ibid. 
13 
weapons stockpiles are being held hostage to long-awaited societal needs in the Russian 
regions. "34 
D. CONCLUSION 
Russia possesses the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons and has 
assumed the responsibility of eliminating the total arsenal in accordance with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Russia has developed the legal framework and chemical 
weapons destruction plan in accordance with ewe requirements but has faced significant 
challenges in its implementation. 
Due to its economic troubles, Russia is not able to pay for its chemical 
demilitarization program and must rely heavily on foreign assistance to eliminate its 
stockpile. The European Union and various Western European states have contributed 
technical and financial aid for the destruction of Russia's blister agents. The United 
States, the largest contributor to Russia's ew destruction program, has focused its 
assistance on the disposal ofRussia's nerve agents; this effort includes the funding of a 
pilot nerve-agent destruction facility at the Shchuchye site. Overall, foreign assistance 
falls far short of the billions necessary to eliminate the Russian stockpile. 
Aside from financial shortfalls, Russia faces an equally challenging social 
obstacle to its CW destruction. Progress to destruction is stymied by the health and 
environmental concerns of the impoverished communities near the chemical storage sites. 
Chemical weapons are being "held hostage" until regional authorities are satisfied that 
the safety of their citizens and the environment will be insured and that its socioeconomic 
infrastructure will be improved. It is clear that destruction of Russia's chemical weapons 
34 Walker, "Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention." 
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arsenal will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in the next ten to fifteen years if 
these challenges are not met. 
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m. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SECURITY CONCERNS 
A. ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
The legacy of the Soviet Union's disposal of chemical weapons reflects a low 
regard for environmental security and public health. The USSR discarded chemical 
weapons by sea dumping (in the Baltic Sea, Pacific Ocean, Arctic Ocean, and the White 
Sea), open-pit burning, and burial, all of which are now illegal methods of disposal under 
the CWC. 35 Lev Fedorov, the president of the Union of Chemical Safety, estimates that 
the Soviet military dumped or buried close to half a million tons of chemical weapons 
between the end of World War II and the late 1980s.36 
The Russian government has publicly declared the possession of 40,000 tons of 
chemical agents in stockpile; but it has never acknowledged the numerous aerial bombs 
filled with chemical agents that were secretly dumped and destroyed in past decades, nor 
does it need to by ewe standards. According to the ewe, a state party with chemical 
weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 or dumped at sea before 1 January 
1985 may choose whether or not to recover them. However, if a state party chooses to 
recover them, it must publicly declare the weapons and destroy them. 37 
The Russian government has not acknowledged the areas where chemical 
weapons were buried, incinerated, or dumped possibly due to the financial and social 
35 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 91. 
36 David Hoffinan, "Russia's Forgotten Chemical Weapons." The Washington Post (16 August 1998). 
Available [Online]: <http:/ /washingtonpost. cornlwpsrv/inatlllongterm/ coldwar/leonidovkaa. htm. [17 March 
2000]. 
37 Chemical Weapons Convention. 
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responsibility it would have to assume in the recovery and destruction of the abandoned 
weapons, followed by decontamination of the affected areas. The reluctance to identify 
these hazardous areas may also stem from the Russian government's tradition of secrecy 
and denial. Throughout its history, the Soviet Union attempted to keep the chemical 
arsenals and bomb factories, and the subsequent pollution, a strict state secret. Even 
today, information on the clandestine dumping and old destruction sites remains 
classified information. 
The Russian military has failed to take any responsibility for its actions 
concerning past chemical weapons disposal, dismissing evidence of the toxic sites and 
the reports of associated health problems. Colonel-General Stanislov Petrov, officer-in-
charge of chemical weapons, stated that the search of military archives found 
"insufficient information to locate such dumps," which are nonetheless not "priority 
targets." He added, " I think this problem does not exist for us. The burials in the ground 
were nothing at all on Russian territory." 38 
The Russian government and its military have failed to acknowledge these 
"chemical graveyards" despite the severe ecological and public health crises they have 
caused within nearby communities. Independent research regarding these affected areas 
has provided insight on the potential environmental and health risks posed by the 
declared stockpiles. 
1. Effects of Past Practices 
In 1998, Vladimir Pankratov, environmentalist and head of the Penza chapter of 
Green Cross, led a team of experts in examining soil samples taken from an abandoned 
38 Petrov quoted in Hoffinan, "Russia's Forgotten Chemical Weapons." 
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munitions dump at Leonidovka. Buried at the site are World War II aerial bombs, which 
contained a volatile mixture of lewisite, a blistering poison gas, and yperite, a sulfur 
mustard gas. This abandoned site is located a few hundred yards from the military base, 
which houses a declared stockpile of nerve agents. 
The group's fmdings are alarming. The soil where chemical weapons were 
destroyed contained heavy concentrations of arsenic, an average of 30 grams per 
kilogram of soil, found six to sixteen feet deep. According to Pankratov, this average is 
15,000 times greater than the permissible concentration of arsenic by Russian standards, 
which is 2 milligrams per kilogram of soil. Although the lewisite from the weapons had 
dissipated, studies have shown that arsenic compounds can remain in the soil for dozens 
of years. Within a few miles of the dump, Pantkratov' s group found levels of arsenic ten 
times the permissible level in the bottom sediments of the Sursk Reservoir. The Sursk 
Reservoir is the source of drinking water for the people of nearby Penza, a city of 
530,000 inhabitants located approximately 350 miles southeast ofMoscow. Arsenic is 
highly toxic, known to cause a violent, painful death in cases of acute poisoning and to 
cause a number of serious ailments, including cancer, in cases of long-term exposure. 39 
Leonidovka holds but one of the many abandoned munitions dumps in Russia that 
have created an ecological nightmare. According to Green Cross Russia, medical staff 
have noted among the populations of these polluted regions "the appearance of special 
39 Ibid. 
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kidney and stomach diseases connected with the accumulation in the body of harmful 
chemical elements such as arsenic and fluorine" and a high incidence of cancer.40 
2. Potential Hazards of Declared Stockpiles 
In addition to the abandoned munitions dumps, conditions at the declared 
chemical weapons depots present a great potential for an environmental and public health 
disaster. Studies have found adverse effects on public health among the populations 
living near the declared stockpiles also. Tatyana Grozdova, deputy director of a regional 
children's hospital in the Saratov region, conducted a series of screenings in 1994 and in 
1995 of 595 children living in Gorny and nearby villages. Her findings indicated that the 
closer a child lived to the chemical weapons depot, the higher the incidence of disease, 
most often in the form of skin diseases and disorders within the urinary system or 
digestive organs. Grozdova admits the research is incomplete due to the lack of money 
for sophisticated tests, proper equipment, and toxicologists. Also, the Russian military is 
uncooperative, refusing to provide information concerning possible leaks or dumping of 
toxic chemicals from the base.41 
The stockpile of blister agents at Gorny and Kambarka represents the greatest 
threat to the environment and public safety. These two depots possess the oldest of 
Russia's chemical weapons. Blister agents, some produced in the 1940s, are stored here 
in 80-ton steel containers with walls less than half an inch thick. According to Lieutenant 
General Yuri Tarasevich, division deputy of Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Safety, 
40 Anna Shcherbakova, "Poisonous Bomb" Green Cross Russia (20 May 1997)." Available [Online]: 
<http://www.gci.ch/GreenCrossPrograms!legacy/articles!Poisonous.html. [17 March 2000]. 
41 Hoffman, "Russia's Forgotten Chemical Weapons." 
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"the walls of storage tanks are corroded" and at the Shchuchye site, buildings containing 
nerve agents are "becoming decrepit." Public safety and environmental concerns are 
high; for some speculate that the heavy rains in the region could lead to an ecological 
catastrophe, as several storage facilities have flooded in the past. Unfortunately, most of 
the storage facilities are not even equipped with a basic alert mechanism to warn of 
dangerous levels of toxins in the air. 42 
B. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
According to researchers Joseph Douglass and Neil Livingstone, "The amount of 
VX (a nerve agent) that one can place on the head of a pin is sufficient to produce death 
in a human being. "43 Richard Clark writes, "A canister of VX dropped from any tall 
building or sprayed over a large city from a private plane would kill millions. "44 The 
Leonidovka military base, which holds only 17% of Russia's stockpile, possesses more 
than enough nerve gas, if distributed by individual doses, to kill every human being on 
earth.45 
Nerve agents are extremely toxic and work rapidly. In the form of gas, aerosol, or 
liquid, the nerve agent enters the body through inhalation or through the skin. At first, 
the victim experiences difficulty in breathing accompanied by violent coughing. This is 
followed by gastro-intestinal pain, which may lead to cramping, vomiting, and possibly 
42 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 95. 
43 Douglass and Livingstone quoted in Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Chemical Terrorism." 
Available [Online]: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/cherntere.html. [18 March 2000]. 
44 Clark quoted in Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Chemical Terrorism." 
45 Ho:ffinan, "Russia's Forgotten Chemical Weapons." 
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involuntary discharge of urine and defecation. If the body is exposed to a high 
concentration of the nerve agent, e.g., 200 mg sarinlm3, death may occur within a couple 
of minutes. Death by lethal exposure to nerve agents is likened to death by suffocation. 46 
On 20 March 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacked a Tokyo subway system with 
the chemical agent sarin, which resulted in 12 deaths and over 5,000 injured passengers. 
Reports state that this terrorist operation would have claimed thousands of lives had the 
weapon been delivered as an aerosol instead of allowing the sarin to evaporate from the 
small containers placed on the subway trains.47 Investigations following the attack 
discovered that Aum Shinrikyo had connections with people from the Russian Radiation, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and 
Russian Intelligence. Aum leaders had made numerous visits to the former Soviet Union 
to acquire equipment and technical knowledge for the production of weapons of mass 
destruction. Although the cult members produced the sarin themselves, allegedly from a 
Russian military recipe, the investigation's findings indicate that it is possible that 
Russian CW has been or will be diverted to interested parties. 48 
1. The Demand for Chemical Weapons 
According to Michael Moodie, chemical weapons "represent an option of 
increasing interest to nonstate actors, particularly terrorists." He also states that "CW 
46 FOA Briefing Book on Chemical Weapons. "Chemical Warfare Agents: An Overview of Chemicals 
Defined as Chemical Weapons" Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
homepage. Available [Online]: <http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/cwagents.htm. [18 March 2000]. 
47 Michael L. Moodie, "The Chemical Weapons Threat" in The New Terror ed. Sidney D. Drell, Abraham 
D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 15. 
48 Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical Weapons." 
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remain the least glamorous of weapons of mass destruction; but they have been the most 
used."49 "For NBC [Nuclear, Biological, Chemical] terrorism," writes Wayman Mullins, 
"chemical agents are the ideal weapon and offer the greatest probability of success," 
given their characteristics of easy dispersal. so Moreover, CW effects are more 
containable and controllable than those of nuclear or biological weapons. 
Many chemical munitions are relatively small in size;· small enough to fit in a 
backpack, allowing the terrorist to conceal and transport them with little difficulty. 
Protective gear and gas masks are available commercially. The employment of a 
chemical weapon would be more straightforward than that of a nuclear weapon in that a 
CW could be delivered with many "existing conventional systems or even homemade 
reconfigured designs." Although the use of chemical weapons would require some effort 
and coordination, the Aum Shinrikyo cult demonstrated that it is possible for groups 
possessing sufficient resources, technological infrastructure, and determination to use 
CW. One such group, the Hezbolla, have attempted to purchase chemical and biological 
weapons from Eastern Europe, according to a 1998 London Times report.Sl 
The stockpile of nerve agents in Russia provides an attractive source for terrorists 
wishing to acquire chemical weapons. Compared to the sarin produced by the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult, the nerve agents at Russian sites are of the highest purity and therefore 
49 Moodie, "The Chemical Weapons Threat," 6. 
SO Mullins quoted in Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Chemical Terrorism." 
51 limes (London), 3 March 1998, quoted in Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical 
Weapons." 
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more lethal and effective. 52 The munitions stored at the depots are in good condition, 
portable, and have "excellent agent-dispersal ability."53 However, these munitions are 
not loaded with explosives or propellants. This deficiency may deter terrorists who do 
not have the sophisticated equipment and technical expertise to provide a delivery 
mechanism.54 
2. · Security Management At Declared CW Sites 
In 1995, Dr. Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center published a report entitled 
"Improving the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons Stockpile," which compiled the 
security observations by persons who had visited Russian CW sites. The report identifies 
alarming deficiencies in the physical security and weapons accounting at CW storage 
facilities and makes evident these facilities' high vulnerability to theft. Smithson's 
findings corroborate with the consensus of Russian military officers who readily admit 
that the security measures at the facilities are "inadequate" and who contend that the CW 
munitions are even more susceptible to theft now that the locations of the seven storage 
sites have been made public. 55 
The strength of perimeter security at the facilities is meager. Sites are enclosed 
with two to four concentric rings of fencing, either chain link, barbed wire, or electrified. 
Much of the fencing has rusted or completely worn away. Some sites do not have proper 
52 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 95. 
53 Igor Khripunov and Jonathan Tucker, "Don't Downplay Threat From Moscow's Arsenal," Los Angeles 
Times (18 August 1999). Available [Online]: <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reportslkhrituck.htm. [18 March 
2000]. 
54 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 95. 
55 Vogel, "Ensuring the Security ofRussia's Chemical Weapons." 
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clear zones or patrol paths along fencing located adjacent to woods or villages providing 
good covert entry points. At each site, there are separate gates for personnel, railroads, 
and vehicles; yet only the main gates are consistently manned with guards. The railroad 
gates are secured with padlocks while the side pedestrian entrances are routinely 
unsecured. At two of the seven sites, the perimeter lights are either too few in number or 
poorly maintained, while the remaining five sites have no perimeter lighting at all: None 
of the CW sites' entrances is equipped with intrusion detection systems or closed-circuit 
televisions. 56 
The physical condition of the storage buildings is appalling. Some chemical 
munitions are stored in cement buildings with either steel or wood doors, while others are 
stored in buildings constructed entirely of wood Each door is secured with a single key 
padlock. Some buildings have roofs with gaping holes. At one site, intrusion detection 
devices (circuit breakers) on building entrances were observed, yet none of the CW sites 
post guards at individual storage buildings. 57 
Russian inventory and accounting practices for CW are very rudimentary. The 
munitions and missile warheads are kept in "wine rack" type storage units distinguished 
only by production lot number and not by serial numbers. In contrast with U.S. practice 
(regular inspections and computerized inventory), individual Russian officers are 
personally responsible for munitions tracking and accounting, kept by handwritten log, of 
hundreds of munitions dispersed among several storage units; but it is often enlisted 




performed at the CW sites, and it is "unclear whether inventory records are updated to 
reflect the periodic removal of leaking munitions. "58 With this type of accounting system 
in place, missing munitions could go unnoticed for days, weeks, or even longer. 
3. Proliferation Risks 
The inadequate physical security and munitions tracking of the Russian stockpile 
make the chemical munitions highly susceptible to theft and smuggling. There are few 
documented cases of attempted smuggling of chemical agents from Russia. In 1996, the 
Istanbul Security Directorate seized 20 tubes of Russian-made nerve and blister agents 
from a potential trafficker named Emim Ekinci. In an undercover sting operation, 
detectives agreed to pay Ekinci $1 million for the chemical agents. During his 
interrogation by police, Ekinci disclosed that he had acquired the containers from a 
former KGB officer in Russia and that he was prepared to sell them to any interested 
buyer. A report of an alleged smuggling came in 1997 when Chechen leader Salman 
Raduyev announced that he had acquired Russian CW and issued public threats to use 
them. 59 
Plagued with economic crisis, widespread government and military corruption, 
and organized crime, Russia is an environment apt for the proliferation of chemical 
weapons. A market for illegal arms both inside and outside Russia is thriving. Due to its 
economic restrictions and military downsizing, the Russian government's ability to 
combat illegal arms activity has diminished. For those military members who remain, the 




personnel, the inadequate security and accounting practices at the CW sites, and the 
number of criminal elements able to pay substantially for arms, the possibility of insider 
theft of chemical munitions is substantial. Although there are no documented cases 
involving chemical weapons, ''the Russian military and security forces are the principal 
source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional 
conflicts, and corrupt state officials engaged in black, gray, and legal arms markets in 
their various dimensions. "60 
Future proliferation of Russia's chemical weapons is a legitimate concern. 
Colonel-General Stanilav Petrov, commander of the Radiological, Chemical, and 
Biological Protection Troops, has acknowledged the weaknesses inherent in Russia's 
security measures for the stockpile and has warned that the continued existence of 
Russia's CW is an increasing temptation for "madmen" and "terrorists."61 Dr. Graham 
Turbiville, senior analyst with the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, has 
argued that "the protection of Russian military chemical agents and the potential vectors 
for their diversion constitute a problem at least as large as the nuclear proliferation 
issue."62 
60 Turbiville quoted in Voge~ "Ensuring the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons." 
61 Petrov quoted in Monterey-Moscow Study Group on Russian Chemical Disarmament, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War: Overcoming Obstacles to Russian Chemical Disarmament." Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report (1998). Available [Online]: <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/mmsg.htm. [March 17, 2000]. 
62 Turbiville quoted in Voge~ "Ensuring the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons." 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The continued existence of the Russian stockpile poses serious threats to 
environmental and international security. Russia's past practices of chemical weapons 
disposal have created public health hazards among the communities living near the 
"chemical graveyards." Although its government and its military fail to acknowledge the 
abandoned munitions dumps or to address the growing concerns of the public, Russia 
faces an even greater environmental challenge ahead. The deteriorating conditions of the 
storage tanks at Gorny and Kambarka which hold blister agents produced in the 1940s 
could cause an ecological catastrophe that would affect people well beyond Russia's 
borders. 
Russia's CW stockpile poses a serious challenge to U.S. non-proliferation efforts. 
The locations of Russia's chemical munitions sites are now publicly known but the 
protection of those sites remains grossly inadequate. The most obvious weaknesses of 
Russian CW physical security are the lack of sophisticated security devices, such as 
intrusion detection systems and closed circuit TV, the weak building construction, and 
the highly penetrable locks and physical barriers. The rudimentary inventory and 
tracking practices of the stockpile would probably permit the loss of a chemical munition 
to go unnoticed. This circumstance increases the risks of insider theft and smuggling. As 
the demand for weapons of mass destruction persists, Russia's chemical weapons 
stockpile remains an attractive target for terrorists and the illegal arms market. 
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IV. THE SHCHUCHYE PROJECT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has provided financial and technical assistance for the 
destruction of Russia's chemical weapons through the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, commonly known as the 
Nunn-Lugar Act, established the CTR program in 1991. Sponsored by Democratic 
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the 
Threat Reduction Act was designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and to "facilitate the safe transport, storage, safeguarding and 
destruction of such weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor states." 
Since 1991, the CTR program has provided more than $2.4 billion in assistance to the 
former Soviet Union (FSU), primarily directed towards the dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons.63 
The CTR program outlined five objectives derived from U.S. "congressional 
directives, national security priorities, and foreign policy goals." Objectives one through 
three focus on control and reduction of nuclear arms, while objective five is a general 
commitment to military reform and the reduction of proliferation threats in the FSU. The 
fourth objective is "to assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate and prevent 
63 Amy Smithson, "US Assistance to Russia's Chemical Weapon Destruction Programme," in Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Political, Legal, and Technical Aspects, ed. John Hart and Cynthia Miller, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies, vol. 17 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 123. 
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proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and associated capabilities. "64 To 
accomplish this objective, the Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Program 
(CWDSP) was established within the CTR organization to specifically manage threat 
reduction issues pertaining to chemical weapons. Its primary mission is "to support the 
safe, secure, timely, cost-effective and environmentally sound destruction of the Russian 
Federation chemical weapons stockpile,"· with priority given to the destruction of nerve-
agent filled munitions. 65 
U.S. financial and technical assistance supports CWDSP efforts in accomplishing 
the following goals to ''jump-start" Russia's chemical weapons destruction program: 
1) Initiate the design and construction of the first stage of the Russian nerve 
agent destruction facility at Shchuchye to support Russian development of the 
full-scale facility. 
2) Work with Russian scientists in the technical evaluation of the selected 
disposal technology for the Shchuchye facility. 
3) Provide the equipment and technological support to enable the Russians to 
conduct monitoring and analysis of the stored chemical weapons and of the 
effectiveness of the selected disposal technology. 
4) Train Russian personnel to operate the analytical and monitoring equipment 
and to support operations at the new facility. 
5) Provide funding for the public outreach efforts of the Russian Federation to 
facilitate communication with Russian citizens about the chemical weapons 
disposal process. 66 
The main thrust of CWDSP efforts is the creation of a pilot nerve-agent 
destruction facility at Shchuchye. The plan calls for Russia's Ministry of Defense 
64 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Objectives," Available [Online]: <http://www.dtra.miVctr/02object.html [24 September 2000). 
65 Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD), "Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Program 
Overview," Available [Online]: <http://131.92.71.231/graphical!CTRIIP/FS/CTR_ Overviewfmdex.html. [24 September 2000). 
66 Ibid. 
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(MOD) to take over the stage one destruction facility "after a successful demonstration of 
the facility's effectiveness in destroying nerve agent-filled munitions in a safe and 
environmentally sound manner." The MOD will then become solely responsible for the 
"operation of the destruction facility, its expansion to a full-scale facility, and the 
ultimate disposal of the stockpile at Shchuchye." Using the technical knowledge gained 
from the Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Program, Russia will be independently 
capable of building future facilities at the four remaining nerve-agent stockpiles. 67 
For this cooperative project to proceed, Russia must fulfill a number of 
obligations itself. First, the Russian central government is responsible for the 
construction of auxiliary improvements to the industrial infrastructure, which will support 
the Shchuchye destruction site. The site will require well-made roads, electric power 
supplies, water and sewer systems, as well as housing for the construction workers. The 
United States agreed to underwrite a share of these improvements considered to be 
"inside the fence" ofthe destruction site. 
Second, Russia must independently provide "compensatory" socio-economic 
infrastructure projects, "outside the fence," to the general community around the 
Shchuchye site, according to its own CW destruction plan. These projects include the 
construction of medical clinics, recreational facilities, and day-care centers. Benefits for 
the local population, guaranteed by President Y eltsin' s decision in 1992 after severe 
public opposition to construction in Chapayevsk, is a political necessity. Finally, the 
Russian central government must address the legitimate environmental and health 
67 Ibid. 
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concerns of the local government and its citizens before CW destruction may 
commence. 68 
B. INITIAL OBSTACLES TOWARD CW DESTRUCTION 
On 30 July 1992, the United States and Russia signed the "Agreement Concerning 
the Safe, Secure, and Ecologically Sound Destruction of Chemical Weapons," known 
also as the CW Destruction Agreement, which officially teamed the U.S Department of 
Defense with Russia's Ministry of Defense to develop a Russian CW destruction plan. 
The agreement provided Russia with the initial $25 million in U.S. assistance toward the 
destruction of its chemical weapons arsenai.69 However, two preliminary decisions 
concerning Russia's CW destruction plan challenged this cooperative effort by the United 
States and Russia: the selection of the destruction technology and the site selection for 
the first chemical weapons destruction facility. 
1. Selection of Destruction Technology 
U.S. officials supported high-temperature incineration as the destruction 
technology for Russia's CW stockpile. Incineration technology had already been tested 
and proven effective in destroying U.S. chemical weapons safely. In operation since 
1990, the U.S. pilot destruction facility on Johnston Island, a remote island over 700 
miles southwest of Hawaii, has used incineration technology producing "satisfactory 
levels of destruction with an enviable safety record." The on-site Fish and Wildlife 
Commission determined that the technology would not endanger the environment. 
68 Monterey-Moscow Study Group, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War." 
69 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "United States Assistance [ to chemical 
weapons destruction in Russia]," Available [Online]: <http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/researchlsipri-bicc-cw-
assist-us.html. [24 September 2000]. 
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Incineration technology had also been accepted by "all appropriate authorities" at the 
storage site in Tooele, Utah, which holds more than 40% of the U.S. stockpile.70 
From the U.S. point of view, selection of incineration technology to destroy 
Russia's CW stockpile is both technically and financially practical. Ten years of U.S. 
research and development for the high-incineration technology cost approximately $2 
billion. To select an alternative method would require "additional time and expense for 
full-scale development and large-scale testing." The United States would provide the 
incineration technology to Russia immediately and "free of charge," which would allow 
the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia to begin much sooner_7l 
Russia's Ministry ofDefense decided against incineration in favor of an untested 
two-stage technology, neutralization followed by bituminization. In this process, the 
munitions first pass through drill-and-drain machines to remove the nerve agent. Russian 
chemical weapons were welded shut during assembly and therefore the nerve agent 
cannot be drained, like U.S. munitions, using reverse-assembly technology. Upon 
removal, the nerve agent is chemically neutralized by mixing it with an organic chemical 
reagent [monoethanolamine (MEA) for sarin and soman, or a Russian mixture called 
RD4M for VX]. The neutralized agent, called a reaction mass, concludes stage one of the 
destruction process. During stage two of the process, bituminization, the reaction mass is 
mixed with hot petroleum asphalt and solidified. The byproduct, called bitumen salt 
70 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden." 
7l Ibid. 
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mass, is placed in steel barrels and buried in specially designed bunkers located above 
groundwater level adjacent to the destruction facility. 72 
Russia's decision on destruction technology caused much frustration and 
confusion among U.S. officials. The Ministry of Defense explained that the local 
population had rejected the use of incineration technology within their communities. 
U.S. officials were surprised that the Russian people, given their strong distrust of 
government projects, would accept an unproven Russian destruction technology and 
reject an established technology, already accepted by their counterparts in America. In 
addition, neutralization-bituminization leaves behind a waste product, which must be 
stored permanently in bunkers, while incineration leaves no residue that poses a possible 
long-term liability. 73 
Russia's development of the two-stage process had not gone beyond some initial 
laboratory work, guaranteeing that Russia's CW destruction plan would take longer and 
cost more to implement than one based on U.S. incineration technology. According to 
CTR requirements, no more than 50% of the funds allocated toward Russian CW 
destruction could be spent until the President of the United States had certified that a 
U.S.-Russian evaluation of the two-stage process had been completed_74 The joint 
evaluation of the destruction process began in 1994. 
72 PMCD, "Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Planned for Kurgan Region," Available [Online]: 
<http:/1131.92. 71.231/graphical/CTR/IP/FS/CWDF _ Descriptionfmdex.html. [24 September 2000]. 
73 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden." 
74 SIPRI, "United States Assistance [to chemical weapons destruction in Russia]." 
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The first test was conducted between May and August 1995 at the U.S. Army's 
Chemical and Biological Defense Command at the Edgewood Area of the Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, Maryland. The second test was conducted between October and 
November 1995 at the Saratov Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defense 
near Moscow. Both tests demonstrated that the two-stage process "could achieve 
consistently high destruction efficiencies." Subsequently, a Peer Review Committee, 
consisting of three Americans and three Russians, evaluated the test results and 
concluded that neutralization-bituminization technology met or exceeded requirements 
for safe and effective CW destruction. A final report of the test results, released in March 
1996, indicated that the two-stage destruction process "effectively eliminated 99.99 
percent of three types of nerve agents, while the bitumen salt mass resulting from the 
two-stage process was determined to be safe for disposal in a specially constructed 
landfill. "75 
The selection of a destruction technology presented the United States and Russia 
with a technical and political challenge. Aside from the additional expenses and efforts 
needed to test and evaluate Russia's two-stage technology, the selection caused a two-
year delay, which further exasperated the U.S. Congress, where serious doubts about 
Russia's commitment to destroy its CW arsenal were beginning to surface. 
2. Site Selection for Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) 
For the United States, the first Russian chemical weapons depot selected for 
destruction should satisfy two simple criteria. The first criterion, maximum reduction of 
the military threat, pointed toward the selection of one of the larger nerve-agent 
75 PMCD, "Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Planned for Kurgan Region." 
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munitions depots. As explained in Chapter Ill, Russia's nerve-agent munitions could 
pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than its blister agents. The second criterion, 
minimum expense of time and money, calls for a CW munitions depot with developed 
infrastructure of power, water, and roads. The selected depot should have a pool of 
skilled labor already available and be located fairly close to commercial areas to simplify 
the logistics tasks. 76. 
Russia's CW destruction plan calls for blister agents stored in bulk at Gorny and 
Kambarka to be destroyed first, followed by nerve-agent munitions at the five remaining 
depots. Russia is less concerned with the security implications posed by nerve-agent 
munitions than it is with the immediate environmental and public health dangers posed 
by the deteriorating storage tanks containing blister agents.77 Therefore, when the U.S. 
Congress approved $78.5 million in CTR funds for the construction of a pilot nerve-agent 
destruction facility in 1996, some officials in Moscow publicly complained that the U.S. 
funding was largely misdirected. Alexander Pikayev of the Moscow Carnegie Center 
argued that the U.S. funding should be directed toward Gorny and "its leaky containers of 
now inert gases," but he understood the United States choice to first remove the nerve 
agents which were "still of military value. "78 In December 1996, the Ministry of Defense 
selected the Shchuchye CW depot to be the location of the U.S.-funded facility.79 
76 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden." 
77 Monterey-Moscow Study Group, "Eliminating a Deadly Legacy of the Cold War." 
78 Saradzhyan, "Russian Chemical Arms Disposal Plan Falters," 18. 
79 Smithson, ''US Assistance to Russia's Chemical Weapon Destruction Programme," 126. 
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The town ofShchuchye (pop. 11,100) is located in the Kurgan region of western 
Siberia, 975 miles southeast of Moscow. The smallest of five depots containing nerve 
agents, Shchuchye represents less than 14% ofRussia's total CW stockpile. 
Approximately 5,600 metric tons of chemical agents are stored in almost two million 
munitions at Shchuchye. 80 
Unfortunately, Shchuchye is also the site "farthest from any point of entry that 
would be convenient to shipments from the United States or Europe."81 The Kurgan 
region is a predominantly rural area with little heavy industry and a struggling economy. 
The region has a limited water supply which has been subjected to "heavy metals, 
radioactive materials, liquid municipal wastes, and effluents from industry, farms and 
households, largely disposed into ponds and swamps without drainage, where they are 
neither diluted nor treated." The impact of these waste practices has been highly 
detrimental to the environment, reducing the quality of ground and surface water, soil 
conditions, plant and animal life. Understandably, human health concerns are prevalent 
among the residents of the Kurgan region, which lacks comprehensive medical 
services. 82 
Russia's selection ofShchuchye, the smallest and most remote of the nerve-agent 
depots and the one in need of the most extensive infrastructure improvements, caused 
notable frustration among U.S. officials. However, the possible reasons for Russia 
80 PMCD, "Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Planned for Kurgan Region." 
81 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden." 
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selecting this site make sense in terms of Russian interests. First, Russia may have 
chosen the most remote site to develop its unproven neutralization-bituminization 
technology for the safety of its citizens and the environment in the event of an accident. 
(The United States, it will be recalled, chose a remote island 700 miles from Hawaii to 
develop its technology.) The second reason, one possibly less acceptable to U.S. 
officials, may have been that the United States agreed to underwrite some infrastructure 
costs for one CW destruction site, so Russia chose the Shchuchye site because it is the 
most in need of infrastructure improvements. 83 
Both the selection of the destruction technology and the site selection for the first 
chemical weapons destruction facility were critical issues of debate between the United 
State and Russia. At times during the negotiations, the CTR program to assist in Russia's 
chemical weapons destruction seemed destined for termination. Nonetheless, the 
program survived these initial obstacles and has progressively achieved a number of 
accomplishments toward the disposal ofRussia's CW arsenal. 
C. PROJECT MILESTONES 
The joint evaluation of the two-stage destruction process in 1996, which 
confirmed the effectiveness of Russia's proposed technology, represents one of several 
milestones reached by U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program officials and their 
Russian counterparts toward the construction of the destruction facility at Shchuchye. 
The completion of the joint evaluation led to the optimization phase to finalize the testing 
and ultimate implementation of the two-stage technology. The optimization phase, like 
other CW-CTR projects, is a partnership of a U.S. contractor and a Russian organization, 
83 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia: Time to Share the Burden." 
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in this case, the Batelle Memorial Institute with the State Scientific Research Institute for 
Organic Chemistry (GosNIIKhOT).84 The U.S-Russian partnership for the construction 
of the CW destruction facility at Shchuchye has continued to yield substantial 
achievements. 
The United States instituted an internship program for Russian and American 
scientists working on chemical weapons destruction to assist Russia in acquiring the 
skills necessary to execute its CW destruction program and to operate the future facility 
at Shchuchye. The internship program, made possible through a contract with General 
Physics, provided a channel for the exchange of technical knowledge and experience. 
Russian chemical weapons experts visited U.S. chemical weapons training and disposal 
facilities and American scientists made similar visits to Russian installations. 85 
In 1995, the Russian Federation government established a partnership with Green 
Cross International (GCI) to communicate to its population the objectives and activities 
of its CW destruction program and to provide opportunities for public involvement. 86 
The partnership initiated an extensive public outreach program to educate Russian 
citizens on environmental and public health issues in relation to the continued storage and 
destruction of chemical weapons. Forums have provided the local community with the 
opportunity to learn about the international requirements for the CW destruction, the 
technology proposed for use at the Shchuchye CWDF, and the time frame for 
84 PMCD, "Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Program Overview." 
85 Ibid. 
86 PMCD, "Public Outreach and Involvement in the Russian Federation," Available [Online]: 
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implementing and completing the Russian destruction program. Additionally, the forums 
enable the Russian government to learn about community concerns and to address the 
community's questions about CW disposal efforts.87 Green Cross Russia has also opened 
information centers in Kurgan and Shchuchye where the citizens can read information 
brochures, review reference materials, and examine equipment used by chemical 
weapons destruction workers. 88 
The Russian government's campaign to ensure public health and environmental 
protection is supported by federal law, to include fundamental articles in the Federation's 
constitution. Essentially, these laws affirm the rights of citizens to a safe and clean 
environment and to complete access to environmental information. The law entitled "On 
Environmental Protection" states that Russian citizens may request information 
concerning the condition of the natural environment and the measures taken to preserve 
and protect that environment. The law entitled "On Sanitary and Epidemiological 
Welfare of the Population" guarantees citizens' rights to protection from exposure to 
hazardous substances. This legal framework facilitated the incorporation of the Russian 
government's promotion of public health and environmental protection into the overall 
chemical weapons destruction program. 89 
In March 1998, a group of scientists from the Kurgan Public Outreach Office, 
Green Cross Russia, conducted a public opinion poll on the problems of chemical 
87 PMCD, "Chemical Weapons Disposal in Russia: Promoting Environmental and Public Protection," 
Available [Online]: <http://131. 92. 71.231/graphical/CTRIIP/FS/Protection/index.html. [24 September 
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weapons storage and destruction in the Kurgan region. The group's objective was to 
obtain and analyze information on the public's attitude toward the chemical weapons in 
the area, the projected construction of the facility at Shchuchye, and the planned CW 
destruction. Four hundred and ninety-eight individuals living in Shchuchye or nearby 
settlements were specially selected to participate in the poll. The study showed that the 
problem of chemical weapons storage and destruction ranked high in importance, with 
the percentage of individuals not interested in the resolution of this problem within the 
10% range. However, less than 20% of the public's views were primarily based on 
circulating gossip and were of an emotional nature. The public attitude towards 
destruction of chemical weapons in the region appeared to be reasonably positive with 
only 21.5% representing a distinct protest potential and 65% representing support for 
facility construction. 90 
To satisfy its socio-economic commitments to the affected communities, the 
Ministry of Defense is coordinating with the administration of the Shchuchansky district 
and the Kurgan region for the construction of public infrastructure, to include 
construction of schools, hospitals, and housing. The installation of gas and water lines, 
sewage systems, wastewater treatment facilities and roads is also planned. 91 
On 2 October 1998, the future chemical munitions disposal facility site, located 
just outside the town ofShchuchye, was dedicated. U.S. and Russian officials held a 
90 PMCD, "Results of Applied Sociological Study Problems and Perspectives of Chemical Weapons 
Destruction in the Shchuchye Area, Kurgan Region," Available [Online]: 
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special ceremony in which the foundation stone was unveiled and adorned with a plaque 
to denote the achievement of this historic milestone. 92 
On 7 April 2000, the land allocation ceremony for the future chemical munitions 
disposal facility at Shchuchye was held, recognizing the transfer of the land deed from 
the Kurgan regional government to the Russian Ministry of Defense. The transfer came 
to pass when the regional government finally approved the use of the land for the 
construction of the Russian chemical weapons destruction facility. 93 
Prior to official site selection and land allocation, CTR program managers 
awarded several contracts to support the design and construction of the nerve-agent 
destruction facility. Specifically, the Parsons Company of Delaware, which assisted in 
the development of the destruction technology process, is now involved in design 
preparation for the Shchuchye facility. The company was also responsible for providing 
logistical and administrative support to the Moscow-based Chemical Weapons 
Destruction Support Office, which was established in June 1993 as the focal office for 
coordinating the Russian chemical weapons destruction program. 94 
Thus far, the CTR program has been dedicated to activities "leading up to" the 
construction of the Shchuchye facility, including technology development, site selection, 
land allocation, and design of the CW destruction facility. The project's next activities 
92 PMCD, "Joint U.S./Russian Site Ceremony For Future Chemical Weapons Disposal Facility," 
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include "facility construction, operator training, systemization, startup and facility 
turnover" and are currently pending the allocation of additional funds from the U.S. 
Congress and the fulfillment of public infrastructure obligations by the Russian 
Federation government.95 Retired Air Force Brigadier General Thomas Kuenning, 
director of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, has indicated that construction of 
the facility could be finished in 2004 or 2005, with operations beginning in 2006; 
assuming that the schedule is no longer delayed_96 However, the CTR program's Russian 
CW destruction assistance and planned construction of the nerve-agent destruction 
facility at Shchuchye must contend with chronic financial, bureaucratic, and political 
challenges. 
D. THE SHCHUCHYE PROJECT DILEMMA 
The United States invested $194 million toward the construction of the 
Shchuchye facility through 1999. For the FY 2000 budget, the Department of Defense 
requested $475.5 million for the CTR program, of which $130.4 million was directed 
toward security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites and construction of the 
Shchuchye facility. The Administration's request, including the $130.4 million for the 
CW -CTR program, was approved by both the Senate Defense Authorization Bill and the 
Senate Defense Appropriations Bill. The request was then adjusted when it passed 
through the House Defense Authorization Bill, which authorized only $444.1 million for 
the entire CTR program and only $24.6 million for the chemical weapons provision. 
Funding for the Shchuchye project was "zeroed ouf' in the National Defense 
95 PMCD, "Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Planned for Kurgan Region." 
96 Walker, "Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention." 
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Authorization Act for FY 2000, which eannarked the $24.6 million to fund security 
enhancements at the CW storage sites. No funds, according to Sec. 1305 of the 
Authorization Act, "may be obligated or expended for planning, design, or construction 
of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. "97 
When the legislation was signed into law on 5 October 1999, President Clinton 
urged the Congress ''to reverse its current ban on chemical weapons destruction· 
assistance to Russia." Officials for the CW-CTR program remained hopeful because the 
Administration planned to present the next Congress with a detailed proposal to resume 
funding for the Shchuchye project.98 Defense Secretary William Cohen and General 
Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both appealed to Congress to restore 
funding and warned that chemical weapons are "highly desirable weapons for terrorists 
and rogue states and represent a serious proliferation threat. "99 
Despite the appeals and warnings, the House Armed Services Committee recently 
passed legislation that denied President Clinton's request of $35 million for Russian 
chemical weapons destruction in FY 2001. Global Green USA, the American affiliate of 
Green Cross International, publicly criticized the committee's legislation. Dr. Paul 
97 Authorization Act quoted in Laura Beers, "Funding Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction." Center 
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Walker, Green Cross Legacy Program director in Washington, argued that the 
"destruction of battlefield-ready Russian chemical weapons is one of the best national 
security investments" and that this "legislation contradicts all of our nonproliferation 
policies." Global Green USA Executive Director Matt Peterson explained that 
"continued American support for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program is 
critical to the implementation of the international Chemical Weapons Convention." 
Petersen's organization successfully advocated the inclusion oflanguage in the 
legislation that would keep the program running with prior-year funds.IOO Nonetheless, 
the legislation was less a dramatic policy shift than a predictable consequence of the 
bureaucratic trends and prevailing political climate concerning the CW -CTR program 
within the U.S. Congress. 
A complex legislative process has been a perpetual challenge to funding CW 
destruction in Russia since the commencement of the CTR program. Although the 
president proposes a defense budget to Congress reflecting his administration's pledges 
to international agreements or foreign governments, Congress has "the power of the 
purse" and "has several opportunities to adjust or even totally cancel budgetary requests 
in a multi-step process whereby funds are authorized and appropriated." The CTR 
program budget, which "traditionally represents less than two-tenths of one percent of the 
entire Department of Defense budget," is incorporated in the defense authorization bill 
100 Business Wire, "Global Green USA Critical of Congress for Denying '00 Funding for Russian 
Chemical Weapons Destruction," Available [Online]: 
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prepared by the Senate Anned Services and the House National Security committees.101 
The challenge is that even before members of the House and the Senate vote on funding 
for CTR, "no less than six different committees, with literally hundreds of legislators, 
have had an opportunity to change the level of CTR funding and to propose conditions 
about how it can be expended. "102 
To complicate an already complex process, legislators have often stipulated · 
"items of special interest," conditions or certifications to the defense authorization bills, 
which have either delayed, reduced, or taken away funds allocated to CTR. Several 
examples illustrate this legislative technique. In the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act, 
Congress approved $73 million for chemical weapons destruction, yet $60 million of that 
amount could not be used by CTR until the president certified that 
(a) Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention; 
(b) Russia has agreed to procedures to govern site visits under the September 
1992 trilateral agreement to resolve compliance concerns about Russia's 
biological weapons programs; 
(c) British and U.S. officials have visited four declared military biological 
facilities in Russia; 
(d) Russia and the USA have completed the joint study ofthe feasibility of a 
chemical weapon destruction technology; 
(e) Russia is making reasonable progress towards a comprehensive plan to 
implement a chemical weapon destruction program; and 
(f) substantial progress has been made towards resolution of outstanding 
compliance issues under the 1989 Memorandum ofUnderstanding and the 1990 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement.103 
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In addition, Republican Representative Gerald Soloman of New York sponsored 
an amendment to the FY 1996 Defensive Authorization Act, which would have withheld 
CTR funding until the president could certify, among other things, that Russia had ceased 
military actions in Chechnya and was not modernizing its nuclear weapons arsenal. 
Although the Soloman amendment was defeated, the president was still unable to certify 
all the listed conditions and CTR consequently received only $13 million of the $73 
million originally authorized_l04 The remaining $60 million was reallocated to strategic 
delivery vehicle dismantlement work in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan_ lOS 
Budget battles also surfaced in the FY 1999 House Defense Authorization Bill. 
The administration's funding request called for allocation of$88.4 million to the CW-
CTR program. The House National Security Committee had serious doubts about 
Russia's ability to satisfy its own financial obligations regarding the Shchuchye project 
and recommended reallocating $53.4 million of the amount to the Strategic Arms 
Elimination Project Ultimately, the entire $88.4 million was conditionally approved in 
the fmal FY 1999 budget, which required the president's written certification that the 
Russian government was satisfying its political and financial obligations for CW 
destruction_I06 
The recurrent competition for funds in Congress was a reflection of the 
legislature's tenuous political support for additional CW-CTR funding, particularly in 
areas that are auxiliary to destruction efforts. The decisions to eliminate CW -CTR funds 
104 Ibid, 131. 
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for the Shchuchye project in FY 2000 and again in FY 2001 can be attributed to differing 
political priorities, financial realities, and lingering uncertainties. 
First, the majority of congressmen do not endorse the view that the assistance 
provided by the CW -CTR program to Russia serves the interests of the United States. 
Many legislators view the funding for the destruction of CW in Russia as another foreign 
aid project and not as an investment in U.S. national security. Given this perception of 
the CW-CTR funding as a "foreign assistance program," it is understandable that it has 
been vulnerable to cuts and termination.I07 Legislators often act to satisfy the immediate 
needs and concerns of the constituents who elected them. Foreign assistance programs 
have never been popular with the average U.S. citizen, who would prefer that government 
spending be directed toward tackling domestic issues, such as lowering taxes, fighting 
crime, or reforming welfare. Only a small percentage of U.S. citizens, well-informed on 
foreign and defense affairs, are likely to be aware of the CTR program and to share the 
view that the assistance to destroy Russia's CW is in the national interests of the United 
States.I08 
Second, Congress evidently does not perceive the stockpile of chemical weapons 
in Russia as a formidable threat to U.S. security. CTR funds for CW destruction in 
Russia were deleted from the FY 2000 budget by Congress, apparently because many 
Members of Congress judged that the program would "achieve less national security 
benefit for the United States than originally anticipated."l09 
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In advocating a reduction in funds for the CW-CTR program, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-
Kansas) said, "Unlike strategic nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, which 
pose a direct threat to U.S. security, the Russian chemical weapons stockpile poses more 
of a local environmental threat than it does a security threat to Americans. "110 Rep. 
Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina), the House Armed Services Committee Chairman, 
recommended the abolition of CTR support for Russian CW demilitarization, ·"arguing 
that nuclear weapons destruction should take complete priority."lll 
Third, Congress understands the stark reality of the potential financial "black 
hole" that assistance to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons represents. A 
recent report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that Shchuchye's 
5,600 tons of nerve agents would probably not be fully destroyed until2017 unless the 
facility design was expanded.ll2 Since so little Russian CW has been destroyed, the cost 
of the completion of the Russian destruction program is likely to increase 
substantially.IB Compounding the financial frustration for the U.S. Congress has been 
the slow progress of the site construction as well as frequent Russian requests that part of 
the U.S. funding go to social programs and local infrastructure.114 Additionally, U.S. 
Members of Congress are reluctant to approve large expenditures for CW destruction in 
110 Roberts quoted in Khripunov and Tucker, "Don't Downplay Threat From Moscow's Arsenal." 
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112 Ibid. 
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Russia because they have witnessed the cost for the U.S. chemical weapons destruction 
program rise to over $15 billion.115 
Finally, U.S. funding for ew destruction in Russia is unlikely to resume until 
lingering uncertainties concerning Russia's possible development of a new generation of 
nerve agent are resolved. Some legislators were understandably irritated to learn that 
GosNIIOKhT allegedly was and perhaps still intricately involved in a chemical weapon ,. 
development program.ll6 A 16 September 1992 Baltimore Sun article indicated that by 
1987 Soviet scientists had created a new nerve gas called Novichok, which has been 
alleged to be "ten times more lethal than VX," according to Vii Mirzayanov, an employee 
for twenty-six years at the institute where the program was conducted.117 Mirzayanov 
also claims that a binary ew code-named Substance 33 was developed in 1990, of which 
15,000 tons were produced in the city ofNovocheboksarsk but were falsely documented 
to give the impression that VX was being produced.ll& If these allegations are true, the 
implications of such acts are extreme. According to Moodie, it would mean that "Russia 
has covertly developed a new class of nerve agent that it has not declared under the 
ewe. Moreover, it did so in a way consciously designed to circumvent the treaty by 
ensuring that the precursors for such an agent do not appear on the ewe schedules."ll9 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program orchestrated a commendable 
framework with specific goals to assist in the dismantling of the chemical weapons 
arsenal in Russia. The implementation of the CTR program to destroy the nerve-agent 
munitions in Russia encountered immediate obstacles, both technical and political; but 
the cooperation between the two countries continued. However, the most recent 
challenges to the CW -CTR program might be too formidable to overcome. Congress has 
halted funding for the construction of the Shchuchye facility. The decision comes after 
years of bureaucratic struggles, unstable political support, and questionable commitment 
by the Russian Federation in regards to chemical weapons destruction. This puts the 
United States at a difficult crossroads concerning the future of its non-proliferation policy 
and its obligations to uphold the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which 
may soon be without the participation of the Russian Federation. The uncertainties 
associated with Russia's continued adherence to the CWC are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED 
POLICYMAKERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. assistance in the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons has been 
terminated because of various assessments and perceptions. The decision by Congress to 
halt funds for the Shchuchye project was largely influenced by the projected high cost of 
fulfilling the CW -C1R program in Russia, the uncertainty that Russia could satisfy its 
financial and social obligations to the destruction plan, and the suspicions about a 
clandestine CW production program in Russia. Despite the gravity of these 
considerations, U.S. and Allied policymakers should consider the possible implications of 
abandoning the CW destruction effort in Russia. The United States decision to terminate 
assistance for Russian chemical weapons disposal could prove detrimental to the integrity 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, increasing the CW challenge for the United States 
and its allies and enlarging risks for the global environmental. 
B. THE CWC WITHOUT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, Congress opted to earmark $24.6 million to fund 
security enhancements at the Russian CW storage sites while eliminating funding for the 
Shchuchye project in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000. Although 
vast improvements to security at Russia's CW depots are needed, some have suggested 
that such investments, in the absence of funding for Russian CW destruction, represent a 
"band-aid" solution to the problem. According to Igor Khripunov and Jonathan Tucker, 
Only destruction of the weapons will remove the threat. Beyond the 
specter of chemical terrorism, failure to begin prompt destruction of 
Russia's chemical stockpile will have other negative consequences for 
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U.S. security. It will seriously undermine the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the main legal bulwark against the further spread of chemical 
arms. Unable to comply with the obligations to destroy its chemical 
stockpile, Russia may have no choice but to withdraw from the treaty.l20 
Withdrawal of U.S. funding for CW destruction in Russia may indeed constitute a 
factor, among others, leading Russia to withdraw from the ewe. Even with the five-
year extension (discussed in Chapter I of this thesis), Russia will not be able to meet its 
CWC requirements. Russian experts admitted in a recent report that it would take 25 to 
30 years to dispose of the CW stockpiles in Russia.121 Because of its other priorities 
(such as developing new nuclear delivery systems, notably the Topol-M ICBM and the 
Iskander SRBM), the Russian executive has neither the funds nor the support in the State 
Duma to continue the CW destruction program without substantial foreign aid.122 
According to Harold Smith, 
The central problem is the absence of an economic multiplier in the world 
of chemical demilitarization. In essence, a ruble spent on dismantlement 
is a ruble gone, whereas, a ruble spent on a potentially productive factory 
is an investment likely to lead to more rubles, more factories, and to a 
more stable Russia. 123 
Russia's dire economic situation has led some of its officials to question the 
prudence ofMoscow's ratification of the CWC. Tamara Zlotnikova, chairwoman of the 
Duma's Ecology Committee, stated that the ratification of the ewe was a mistake and 
that Russia is not financially capable of successfully implementing its ew destruction 
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plan. In her view, it would be cheaper to preserve the chemical weapon stockpile than to 
destroy it. Other members of the Duma reportedly concur with Zlotnikova's view of 
CWC ratification as a mistak:e.l24 N. Poroskov stated, 
After the August [1998] financial crash the State Duma adopted a protocol 
decision in which there is an instruction to carry out a juridical analysis of 
possible ways for Russia to leave the [CW] Convention. Today, the 
country faces a dilemma: either to strain every nerve and spend our last 
penny to keep to the time-scale laid down in the Convention or to leave · 
it.l25 
The prospect of the CWC levying a financial penalty against an already 
financially strained Russia when it most likely will fail to destroy its chemical weapons 
arsenal by the 15-year deadline may also influence the Russian government to withdraw 
from the treaty. Some analysts have even suggested that Russia's financial incentives for 
withdrawal from the ewe may be reinforced by strategic incentives. 
The strategic implications of NATO enlargement into fonner Warsaw Pact 
territory and introduction of a new NATO strategic doctrine, the perceived 
widening of the military-technological gap between the Alliance 
(particularly the US) and Russia, and the latter's inability to revive its 
military potential through defence integration in the former Soviet space 
and rapid domestic reform, are prompting a far reaching reassessment of 
its security situation. 126 
Although strategic and tactical nuclear weapons remain the primary deterrent 
within Russian military doctrine, perceived emerging threats to its national security may 
cause the Russian Federation to re-evaluate the utility of chemical weapons. Military 
124 Zlotnikova quoted in indirect discourse in Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 93. 
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analyst Vladimir Belous holds that "Losing CW would not substantially affect Russia's 
security" but he warns that times and circumstances are changing. According to Belous, 
Whereas with the end of the Cold War NATO and Russian troops were 
separated by a 'buffer zone' in East Central Europe and favourable 
military-political conditions were created for chemical disarmament, 
'plans to expand NATO to the east, when the bloc's and Russia's forces 
will again be in direct contact, particularly in the Kaliningrad and Baltic 
region, will inevitably lead to a return to the military importance of 
chemical weapons' .127 
Russian opinion concerning the utility of chemical weapons is currently divided. 
A number of communist and nationalist deputies in the State Duma have argued that 
ratifying the ewe and renouncing the use of chemical weapons has been detrimental to 
Russia's defense capability. Nonetheless, Aleksandr Pikaev, the chief counselor of the 
Duma Defense Committee, Aleksandr Pikayev, reportedly said, "the general consensus in 
Russia is that CW are no longer needed- politically or militarily."128 According to 
Derek Averre, "In line with commitments made under the CWC, there is no clear 
indication that any kind of militarily significant CW deterrent is planned."l29 
Under any circumstances, the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
be threatened if the Russian Federation is not a participant. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
Russia possesses the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons. Russia's 
membership therefore is intrinsically important to the effectiveness of the ewe, which 
seeks to ban the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical 
127 Vladimir Belous, "The military-political aspects of chemical disarmament," Khimicheskoe oruzhie I 
problemy ego unichtozheniya, PIR Centre Moscow, 3 (1997) p. 11 quoted in Averre, "Chemical Weapons 
in Russia," 140. 
128 Pikayev statement in February 1997 quoted in A verre, "Chemical Weapons in Russia," 13 7. 
129 Ibid, 136. 
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weapons worldwide. Incentives for members' compliance and for non-signatories' future 
adherence could substantially decrease if Russia preserved its ew capability outside 
ewe supervision. The ewe is instrumental to the delegitimization of chemical 
weapons and a potentially useful device for pressuring "holdout" states, such as Libya, 
North Korea, and Iraq. However, absent Russia's participation, the ewe will "lose 
much of its value, opening wide the door to any nation that chooses to develop an arsenal · 
of chemical weapons."l30 
The ramifications of the ewe without Russian participation would also include 
increased challenges in enforcing WMD nonproliferation policy and in safeguarding 
against environmental and public health hazards. Currently, with the Russian Federation 
party to the ewe, international inspectors and American scientists have access to the 
Russian CW storage depots. Although OPCW inspections and the U.S.-Russian 
internship program cannot guarantee that Russian CW will not be stolen or smuggled, 
especially in small amounts, these formal practices may provide sufficient security 
against large-scale CW transfers.Bl Also, without the cooperative ew monitoring in 
Russia under the auspices of the ewe, the tasks of assessing, warning, and countering 
the potential CW threat become even more daunting for the U.S intelligence community. 
There are two general implications for environmental security if Russia withdraws 
from the ewe. First, the Russian Federation may elect to dispose of its chemical 
stockpile using its past, unsound methods such as sea dumping or open-air burning which 
are now illegal under the CWC. Second, the Russian Federation may simply elect to 
130 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia." 
131 Blackwood, "Arsenic and Old Weapons," 96. 
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abandon all efforts of CW disposal. As discussed in Chapter ill, Russian chemical 
weapons are slowly degrading and, as their active CW agents break down, will become 
even more threatening to the environment as the material housing the agents deteriorates. 
According to Milton Blackwood, "the severity of the environmental threat that these 
storage sites present is a probably better argument for increased aid than the proliferation 
threat. "132 This sentiment is shared by Harold Smith: 
In the long term, the inevitable deterioration of the weapons will first 
threaten local residents and then slowly spread its poison into the national 
and international environments. It is in the interest of all nations, but 
particularly those near Russia's borders, to invest in the short term and 
avoid the consequences of inaction.133 
The United States has provided the bulk of financial assistance to the Russian CW 
destruction program, having committed over $150 million in recent years toward the 
destruction of nerve-agent munitions, in support ofWMD nonproliferation and U.S. 
national security. The European allies, on the other hand, have committed approximately 
$50 million toward the destruction of Russia's blister agents, in an effort to prevent an 
environmental catastrophe. The funding has been grossly insufficient, given the 
estimated billions of dollars it would cost to destroy Russia's entire CW stockpile. The 
funds spent to date have contributed little to alleviating security concerns or 
environmental fears.l34 
132 Ibid, 95. 
133 Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia." 
134 Mikhail Gorbachev, "Time to Abolish Chemical Weapons," Available [Online]: 
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C. ADDIDONAL FUNDS FOR DESTRUCTION 
Whether U.S. assistance to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons is re-
instituted or not, the nations of Europe must assume greater financial responsibility in 
aiding Russia's destruction of its CW arsenal. This deduction is consistent with 
statements made at the 1996 Conference on Dismantlement and Destruction ofNuclear, 
Chemical and Conventional Weapons, held in Bonn, jointly sponsored by NATO, the 
German Foreign Office, and the German state ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia. The 
conference, with all affected parties well represented, devoted the largest share of its time 
to chemical weapons. Joachim Krause, deputy director of the Research Institute of the 
German Society of Foreign Affairs, identified the shortfalls in efforts made by European 
governments: 
How does it come that European and Japanese efforts in this field are 
virtually dwarfed by the U.S. programmes? There is nothing on the side 
of the Europeans that could - even if everything is added together- come 
close to the huge U.S. effort. I always hear European politicians 
complaining about the increasingly inward looking U.S. Congress and the lack of interest in international affairs. I wish we had at least one single parliament in Europe which would show the same degree of international 
responsibility as the U.S. Congress did in this field- and I wish we had 
parliamentarians such as Senators Nunn and Lugar, who made such 
concerns a matter of priority.l35 
There are signs that some European allies are answering the call to increase 
assistance. On 19 April 2000, an agreement between Italy and the Russian Federation 
was reached by which Italy will contribute $8.3 million toward the destruction of CW 
stockpiles at the Kizner and Kambarka sites in the Udmart region. The Director-General 
of the OPCW, Jose Bustani, welcomed the conclusion of the agreement: "This is an 
135 Krause quoted in Smith, "Funding the CW Demilitarization in Russia." 
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excellent example of the sort of international cooperation that will greatly contribute to 
the timely destruction of chemical weapons ... We urge other countries to follow the 
Italian example."l36 The Director-General has also called for establishing a standing 
committee to facilitate the coordination of foreign assistance to the Russian Federation 
and to increase transparency regarding the status of efforts to destroy chemical weapons 
in Russia among all the OPCW Member States. Nonetheless, he underscored the reality 
of the situation: 
We have to face reality - without substantial international assistance 
Russia will not be in a position to destroy its chemical weapons within the 
time frame set by the Convention. A quantum leap in the level of such 
assistance is required for it to reduce, let alone eliminate, the current 
backlog.B7 
D. CONCLUSION 
In view of the decisions by Congress to eliminate CTR funding for CW disposal 
in Russia in the FY2000 and FY2001 budgets, it appears doubtful that the United States 
will resume, much less increase, financial assistance to the Russian CW destruction 
program. This outcome will probably affect the choices the Russian Federation 
government will make concerning the future disposition of its CW stockpile. It is unclear 
whether this decision by Congress reflects U.S. legislators' lack of confidence in Russia's 
political and financial commitment to CW destruction compliant with the CWC or U.S. 
legislators' low regard for the CWC itself. If, however, U.S. legislators sincerely value 
136 Bustani quoted in OPCW Headquarters, "Italian-Russian Chemical Weapons destruction Agreement 
Welcomed by the Director-General of the OPCW," Press Release (20 April2000) Available [Online]: 
<http://www.opcw.nl/week/pressrel!PressRelease _ 00-0 1_ Ita!Rus-Agree.htm. [ 10 November 2000]. 
137 Bustani quoted in OPCW Headquarters, "Russia to Discuss Plans for Destroying its Chemical 
Weapons," Press Release (31 March 2000) Available [Online]: 
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the principles, instruments, and goals of the ewe, they must give strong consideration to 
resuming funding for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. 
The predominant factor influencing the halt of funds to Russian CW destruction 
has been cost. The fact is that Russia will most likely exceed the CWC deadline by many 
years before its entire CW arsenal can be destroyed and the cost could well exceed the 
amount necessary to destroy U.S. CW stockpiles. A decision to halt, resume, or increase 
funds for CW destruction in Russia should reflect a type of cost analysis. As mentioned 
in Chapter IV, funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program traditionally 
represents less than two-tenths of one percent of the entire Department of Defense 
budget. U.S. legislators should consider whether the money saved by eliminating 
financial assistance to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons is worth the 
increased challenges to U.S. nonproliferation policy in deterring the production, 
possession, and use of chemical weapons or worth the weakened integrity of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. They must consider whether the costs of successfully 
destroying Russia's CW arsenal outweigh the potential cost to U.S. national security if 
these weapons are proliferated and used in the future, owing in part to a breakdown of the 
CWC as the keystone of the CW nonproliferation regime. Finally, U.S. legislators should 
question how abandoning the CW destruction effort in Russia is to the benefit of the 
United States and its allies and security partners. 
Of course, the United States should not bear sole responsibility for Russia's 
success or failure in destroying its chemical weapons. Japan and European nations, 
among others, must also consider the value of increased assistance to Russia in 
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eliminating its deteriorating stockpiles, which pose a threat of ecological disaster if 
responsible action is not taken. 
Adequate U.S., European, and Japanese assistance for successful destruction of 
the CW stockpiles in Russia will require a fundamental change in policymakers' 
perspective. Policymakers will only support aid if they do not define assistance to 
Russian CW destruction as a handout or foreign aid but as an investment in their own 
nation's security. Moreover, they must recognize that potential environmental and public 
health disasters are not local problems but global ones. In recent years, significant 
accomplishments and milestones have been achieved in Russia regarding the destruction 
of its CW arsenal. The level of commitment demonstrated by Russia, the United States, 
Japan, and Europe will determine whether and how solutions to this problem are devised. 
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